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Department of Philosophy, York University
e following paper investigates the crucial notion of a “canonical ascription state-
ment” in Bruno Mölder’sMind Ascribed, and argues that the reasons given for pre-
ferring the book’s approach of canonicality to a more common understanding of
canonicality in terms of the ascriptions we would “ideally” make are not only un-
persuasive, but also leave the interpretivist position more open to skeptical worries
than it should be.e paper further argues that the resources for amore compelling
justication of Mölder’s conception of canonicality are already in Mölder’s book it-
self.
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Bruno Mölder’sMind Ascribed (2010)1 is the most thorough and impressive
defense of interpretivism that I have seen. Indeed, its so much so that I nd
very little to disagree with. Still, while I am sympathetic with both the larger
project, and with Mölder’s account of the crucial notion of a “canonical as-
cription statement,” I think that Mölder does himself a disservice with the
reasons he gives for preferring his account of canonicality to a more com-
mon alternative. Not only are his reasons unpersuasive, but they also make
the interpretivist position seem more open to skeptical worries than it is.
Further, the resources for a more compelling justication are, as I will ar-
gue, already in Mölder’s book itself.
Mölder presents the following account of what it is to be in particular
mental state (where “‘X’ stands for a subject of mentalistic ascription, ‘ f ’-
ing species a mental state and ‘p’ gives its content”):
Possession condition for X f ’s that p: f ’s that p is canonically ascribable
to X” (171)
A lot of work is done here with the term ‘canonically,’ since if the possession
condition for X f ’s that p, were merely that ‘ f ’s that p is ascribable to X,’
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the account would be too forgiving. It would leave no gap between actually
having a mental state and merely seeming to an ascriber to have one, and
without such a gap, ascriptions that we intuitively take to bemistaken would
instead have to be treated as constituting attitudes of the purported believer.
Indeed, ‘misascription’ would, on such a view, turn out to be a contradiction
in terms. As Mölder puts it:
If we explain the possession of mental states in terms of their ascriba-
bility, we need a criterion for the kind of ascription that the interpre-
tivist account can utilize for its purposes. e reason for this is that
not every particular ascription is up to the required level. Oen we
make ascriptions on the basis of insucient data, or we do not pay
attention to the dierent aspects of the situation. us, if the theory
were to claim that X has all those mental states that one could ascribe
to X, it would hardly be believable. What we need is to x a standard
for ascriptions that can play the constitutive role that is designated for
them in the ascription theory. I shall call the ascription that conforms
to this standard a canonical ascription. Using this term, we can say
that one has a mental state provided that it is canonically ascribable
to one. is notion can also be used to draw the distinction between
the correct and the incorrect ascription. Hence the distinction is an
interpretivist version of the is/seems dierence. (170)
Mölder explicates this crucial notion of canonical ascription as follows:
As is a canonical ascription statement =d f As is a statement in approx-
imation to themaximum coherence with the ascription sources c1,. . . ,
c4 and if As were in fact ascribed, it would not require revision. (175)
‘e ascription statement As’ is meant to stand here for statement like ‘X
f ’s that p’ (175.) and, crucially, ‘ascription sources c1,. . . , c4’ stand for (1)
“e . . .other mental states with contents that are ascribable,” (2) “a subject’s
behaviour,” (3) “a subject’s environment, or more exactly, the environmen-
tal stimuli that have an eect on the subject,” and (4) “a subject’s personal
background, which involves facts about the subject’s personal history and
dispositions, their language community and idiosyncratic language under-
standing” (161-162).
Mölder’s decision to explain canonical ascriptions this way raises the
question of why he does not cash out the seems/is in a more familiar fash-
ion. In particular, it raises the question of why the Interpretivist should not
explain the non-canonical/canonical dierence in terms of the ascriptions
that we actually make and the ascriptions that we would ideallymake if our
ascriptions were maximally coherent with complete knowledge of all of the
ascription sources. Mölder, however, explicitly rejects this “ideal” route, and
his reasons for doing so are worth quoting at some length:
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perhaps we can specify the canonicality condition through the notion
of an ideal ascriber. We might say that one has such mental states
that an ideal ascriber would ascribe to one. e ideal ascriber is om-
niscient with respect to the sources and can assess the coherence of
the information better than anyone else. However, this account has
a serious deciency. Namely, it makes all of our ordinary ascriptions
noncanonical, for ordinary folk cannot instantiate the ideal ascriber.
It follows thatwe are alwaysmistaken about others’mental states, and,
what is worse, we are alsomistakenwhenwe engage in self-ascription.
No one can be the ideal ascriber, even in respect of himself, for no one
has privileged access to the ascription sources. Note that the posses-
sion condition is outlined in terms of what is ascribable rather than
in terms of what is in fact ascribed. If we specify the canonicality
condition through the ideal ascriber, the consequence from these two
conditions is that in each case of actual ascription, there is somemen-
tal prole ascribable by the ideal ascriber which may dier from any
prole that could actually have been ascribed.
Hence it is better not to x the canonicality condition to the notion
of an ideal ascriber. Since we routinely ascribe mental phenomena in
everyday life, it would be astounding if the canonical ascription were
in principle inaccessible to us. (172)
Mölder seems to make three crucial assumptions in the passage above:
1. “[O]rdinary folk cannot instantiate the ideal ascriber.”
2. If we cannot instantiate the ideal ascriber, then canonical ascrip-
tions are “in principle inaccessible to us.”
3. If canonical ascriptions are inaccessible to us, then “we are always
mistaken about others’ mental states.”
While I agree with the rst of these assumptions, I would like to call in to
question the second and third and thus the main reasons Mölder gives for
rejecting the idealized notion of canonicality.
Aer all, if canonicality were spelt out in terms of ideal conditions, it
would look something like the following:
As is a canonical ascription statement =d f As is a statement that
is maximally coherent with complete knowledge of the ascription
sources c1,. . . , c4.
On such an understanding of canonicality, it would certainly be the case that
we would not be canonical ascribers, but it does not seem to follow from this
that there would be no sense in which we could make canonical ascriptions.
An ascription, As, that we made could be deemed canonical if it was also
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an ascription that a canonical ascriber would make, even if the grounds we
had for making it ourselves are not themselves canonical. It would seem to
follow then that, contrary to assumption 2 above, canonical ascriptions are,
in fact, accessible to us.
Now one might argue that while the canonical ascriptions are accessible
to us in the sense that we canmake an ascription,As, that also happens to be
a canonical one, they are not accessible to us in the stronger sense that we can
be the ones tomake the ascriptions canonically. But why should thatmatter?
Insisting on such a stronger notion of accessibility would salvage assumption
2, but only at the cost of undermining assumption 3. It is only the weaker
notion of accessibility that is needed for our ascriptions to be true, and so
it is only this weaker notion of accessibility that is required to put to rest
the worry, expressed in the third assumption, that if canonical ascriptions
are inaccessible to us, then our ascriptions will be “always mistaken.” We
make a correct/true ascription if it corresponds to a canonical one, even if
we cannot ascribe it canonically ourselves.
is would leave us with a position on ascription statements very close
to a traditionally popular reading of Peirce’s famous claim that “the opinion
which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we
mean by the truth” Peirce (1992b). On this popular reading, a statement is
true if it would be believed at an idealized “end of inquiry” in which we had
taken our investigation into every question to its ideal limit under epistem-
ically ideal conditions. It is not a consequence of such a view that all of our
beliefs must be false just because they are held under less than ideal condi-
tions. We are not, and probably never will, reach this “end of inquiry” but
our current beliefs can still count as true if they correspond to beliefs that
would be held at that ideal end point.
e idea that a true ascription need only correspond to the ascription
thatwould be canonically ascribed, rather than be canonically ascribed itself,
is a natural one, and seems to be endorsed byMölder himself whenhe admits
thatmany, if notmost, of our ascriptions do notmeet even his own “relaxed”
(173) conditions of canonicality.
A consequence of this account is that it can happen that we do not
recognise the canonical ascription when it is actually made.e rea-
son for this is that although we can in principle instantiate canonical
ascribers, we need not always be suciently well-placed in respect of
the sources and the coherence condition. We do not know whether
we have taken all relevant information into account. But this charac-
terises our epistemic condition in general and it is not a deciency in
the present account, which does not purport to compile a practical
vade-mecum for everyday ascribers. Instead, it attempts to provide a
metaphysical condition for the possession of mental states. (174-175)
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e theory is given a weaker formulation in terms of ascribability,
compared to the stronger but implausible formulation in terms of ac-
tual ascription. For, surely, the examples of actual ascription in every-
day life that satisfy the canonicality requirements are not that numer-
ous. (177)
Of course, a possibly relevant dierence here is that onMölder’s account our
ascriptions are typicallymade in a non-canonical fashion, while on the ideal
understanding of canonicality, they never are made in a canonical fashion,
so for Mölder, As will always be, in principle, ascribable by us.2 Perhaps it is
this in principle accessibility thatMölder takes to be essential, and in the fol-
lowing he stresses the importance of the fact that, on the relaxed conception
of canonicality, we can actually ascribe canonically.
In saying that the canonical ascription must be such that it can be ac-
tual, I mean that it should rely on the sort of information and involve
the sort of computational processes that are in principle accessible to
ordinary folk. We can be canonical ascribers according to this stan-
dard of canonicality.is implies that canonical ascriptions are to be
found in a world like ours, and the threat from omniscient ascribers
is thereby blocked. (174)
But what exactly is the “threat” that the omniscient ascriber would really
present if canonicality were understood in ideal terms?
At times it seems like the underlying worry is epistemic. On both the re-
laxed and ideal accounts an ascription is true if it corresponds to a canonical
one, but on the more relaxed understanding of canonicality, it might seem
that we could, in principle, tell whether an ascription was canonical, while
on the ideal understanding, one could never denitively put to rest the worry
that a particular ascription failed to be canonical, and this leads Mölder to
worry that, “If we reach the canonical method at the end of inquiry, then we
are faced with the consequence that we presently have no idea what mental
states we now “really” have.” (173)
However, if the worry is that we can never knowwhether a particular as-
cription of ours is not mistaken, it is not clear that even the relaxed version
canonicality is free from trouble. Relaxed canonicality may be achievable,
but one can never tell with certainty that one has achieved it (since the epis-
temic possibility that one’s ascriptions may need to be revised can never be
2 Or, possibly, even if they never were on Mölder’s understanding of canonicality, such as-
criptions could, in principle, be made by us, while on the ideal understanding they could
not, in principle, be actually made by us. As he puts it, “It is true that the act of ascription
need not be actual, but all that matters is that canonical ascribers can be actual, that is, or-
dinary interpreters can instantiate the (pleonastic) property of being a canonical ascriber”
(178).
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denitively ruled out).at an account of ascriptions should entail a certain
amount of fallibilism about the ascriptions we make is not a bad thing, and
perhaps the worry is that the ideal account of canonicality pushes one from
fallibilism to skepticism, and that the ideal conditions may be so far from
what we actually do that there is a real worry thatmost, or even none, of our
ascriptions will correspond to the canonical ones. If the idealized notion of
canonicality entailed skepticism rather than just fallibilism, then that would
be reason to reject that account of belief.
Such worries would be similar to those of someone who worried that
Peircean accounts of truth, particularly those that tied truth to what was be-
lieved at some sort of idealized “end of inquiry,” le one open to skepticism,
since it seems possible that none of our beliefs would still be endorsed by
any mythical community that reached such an ideal stage. Peirce (1992a,b)
himself had little time for such doubts, and there are reasons for thinking
that they are especially misplaced when the topic is our ascriptions of men-
tal states.3
Davidson himself gives such reasons in his discussion of the “omniscient
interpreter” in his “A Coherence eory of Truth and Knowledge” (1986)
where he argues that any interpreter, including an omniscient one, would
have to treat most of our beliefs, including our beliefs about what others
believe, as true. Of course, Mölder does not endorse every aspect of the
Davidsonian theory, in particular, its crucial appeal to the Principle of Char-
ity,4 but in the absence of any concrete reason why we should expect such a
divergence from the ideal interpreter, it seems doubtful that we should need
anything like an a priori guarantee that we will match such ascriptions. Fur-
ther, if an omniscient interpreter really did come up with radically dierent
interpretations than we did, its hard to see why that would not give us rea-
son to revise our own, which would undermine their canonicality in even
the relaxed sense. If an ideal interpreter had an interpretation dierent than
our own, presumably that dierence could be explained either in terms of
3 Some (say, Churchland 1981) might argue that all of our ascriptions could turn out to be
false because an ideal ascriber would use a completely dierent taxonomy of mental states,
but such an ascriber would be relying on evidence beyond that available in c1-c4 , and in
any case, Mölder argues persuasively that such a theory would be working with “successor
concepts of folk notions” (132) and would not belie the truth of the claims made with the
folk notions themselves.
4 See, for instance, “Perhaps the most crucial dierence between Davidson’s approach and
the ascription theory is that the ascription theory is not presented as a theory of meaning.
InDavidson’s approach, both a subject’s beliefs and themeanings of his utterances are xed
in the process of (radical) interpretation. It is assumed that the subject’s beliefs conform
to the principle of charity and this allows for the assignment of interpretive truth condi-
tions to the subject’s sentences. For several reasons, I do not think that this can provide a
complete account of meaning.” (124).
34 Interpretivism and ‘‘Canonical’’ Ascriptions
their being aware of some fact that we were unaware of, or in terms of their
being able to tell a more consistent story about those facts than we were, and
either of those scenarios would give us reason to revise our position.
It seems, then, that the reasons Mölder presents for rejecting the ideal
understanding of canonicality are not necessarily compelling. If there could
be an ideal interpreter, it is hard to see why an interpretivist should not un-
derstand our mental states in terms of what they would ascribe to us.
at said, I think that something like Mölder’s notion of canonicality is
preferable to the idealized notion, but this is not because the idealized notion
raises too many worries that there may be “some mental prole ascribable
by the ideal ascriber which may dier from any prole that could actually
have been ascribed” (172), but rather because of doubts about whether there
really could be a determinate ideal interpreter.
To seewhy, consider again the parallelswith the reception of the Peircean
account of truth. As mentioned above, an initially popular conception of
Peirce’s account tied truth to what we would believe at the “end of inquiry,”
where the end of inquiry was understood as the ideal epistemic state where
one’s community had taken its inquiry into every question, under ideal epis-
temic conditions, as far as it could go. e fact that we have not actually
reached such a stage was not a problem for such an account, since our be-
liefs can count as true if they correspond to beliefs that would be at such
a stage. However, explaining what these “ideal epistemic conditions” and
“end of inquiry” were presented serious diculties for the theory, especially
if these later two notions were supposed to be explained without any prior
reliance on the concept of truth. Indeed, many critics came to suspect that
we could make no coherent sense of those notions.5
Such problems have led some of Peirce’s defenders6 to argue that the
Peircean account need not posit any sort of “end of inquiry” where all of
our questions are settled, but rather only needs to state that a belief is true if
it would continue to be held through successive improvements of our epis-
temic position. Whether there could be a single stage where all of our ques-
tions were settled, or any single set of epistemic conditions that are best de-
scribed as “ideal,” is irrelevant to whether our beliefs can be true on such
an account. Such a position hopes to capture what was appealing about the
Peircean view (such as connecting our notion of truth to that of rational-
ity and inquiry, and ruling out the possibility that even our best possible
5 At least partially due to the more “formal” problems that seemed to arise when truth was
dened in terms of an epistemic state that was meant to incorporate the justication for
every truth at once (see, for instance, the discussion of the relation of Peircean truth to
Gödel’s theorem in Johnston 1993).
6 See, for instance, (Misak 2013).
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inquiry into a question could be mistaken) without needing to make sense
of the idea of a global “end of inquiry.” Contemporary Peircean’s are thus
inclined to replace:
P is a true =df P is a statement that we would endorse when we
reached the ideal “end of inquiry.”
With
P is a true =df P is a statement that would continue to be endorsed
no matter how much further we were to investigate and debate.7
Rather than appealing to anything substantial like “ideal epistemic condi-
tions” such an account of truth explains truthwith the comparativelymodest
base of a belief ’s surviving successive improvements to our epistemic posi-
tion. It thus does not have the explanatory burden of explaining what the
ideal epistemic conditions would be, and does not face any problems if the
phrase ‘ideal epistemic conditions’ failed to have a (unique) referent.
I think thatMölder’s account of canonicality has similar advantages over
its more idealized rival.8 e problem with the idealized conception of
canonicality is that it presupposes that we have a clear sense of what it would
be for us to have “maximally coherent beliefs.” However, asMölder discusses
in the book’s h chapter, there are good reasons9 to think that rationality
7 See, for instance, (Misak 2013, 37).e Peircean notion of truth thus turns out to be some-
thing very much like Crispin Wright’s notion of “superassertability” (Wright 1992, 48).
8 Indeed it was not entirely clear to me why one could not even replace Mölder’s
As is a canonical ascription statement =df As is a statement in approximation
to the maximum coherence with the ascription sources c1 ,. . . , c4 and if As
were in fact ascribed, it would not require revision. (175)
With the simpler:
As is a canonical ascription statement =df ifAswere in fact ascribed, it would
not require revision.
Of course, the simpler version seems to be little more than the application of an epistemic
conception of truth to the ascription of mental states, and would seem compatible with
views about the ontology of belief that tied them more closely to brain states, etc. Part of
what makes that account an interpretivist one is precisely that the relevant information is
limited to “the ascription sources c1 ,. . . , c4 ,” and not, say, the readings of an FMRImachine.
Still, that sort of restriction on what type of evidence would be relevant for revision need
not be built explicitly into the denition of canonical ascriptions itself, though perhaps
without it, one could no longer say that “the canonical ascription supplies the condition
that xes the obtaining of such facts” (171).
9 Most famously associated with (Davidson 1980), but see also (McDowell 1985), and (Child
1994).
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is “uncodiable” in a way that prevents there from being a determinate an-
swer to the question of which set of ascriptions best t the ascription sources
and thus be in a position to claim to be “maximally” coherent with them. If
rationality is, “uncodiable” in this way, then there may be no determinate
answer to the question of what set of ascriptions would be maximally co-
herent with the ascription sources, and thus no determinate answer to the
question of what mental states an ideal ascriber would ascribe to us. If ra-
tionality is uncodiable, the ideal conception leaves facts about our mental
life indeterminate in the way that Mölder’s relaxed conception does not. As
Mölder put it, “the [relaxed] notion of canonical ascription helps us to get
rid of the indeterminacy at the level of possession of mental states. When it
is allowed that all variant canonically ascribable mental states are possessed,
then the variation in interpretations does not entail the indeterminacy of the
mental.” (182)
Indeed, this might be a way to make sense of the worry that that, on the
idealized conception of canonicality, it could very well turn out that none
of our actual ascriptions are true. Mölder initially presents this worry as
if it were about the canonical ascriber making a dierent set of ascriptions
than we would (“there is somemental prole ascribable by the ideal ascriber
which may dier from any prole that could actually have been ascribed”),
which is why we might be “always mistaken about other’s mental states.” On
this line of thought, by contrast, the worry is that, on the ideal conception
of canonicality, no ascriptions are canonical, since there is no set of ascrip-
tions that are maximally coherent. If no mental state is canonically ascrib-
able, then the possession conditions for being in a particular mental state
are never satised, and thus any attribution of mental states to others will be
mistaken.10
Of course, arguments about the uncodiability of rationality are always
controversial, but on the approach suggested here, if there does turn out to be
a set of ascriptions that is “maximally coherent” with the ascription sources,
then one should revise one’s ascriptions to match it, leaving the “ideal” and
“relaxed” conceptions of canonicality functionally identical. e ideal con-
ceptionmay thus give the same results as the relaxed conception if rationality
turns out to be codiable, while it commits us to having no mental states at
all if rationality is uncodiable. Compared to the relaxed conception, the
ideal conception of canonicality has very little benets while running the
risk of encouraging serious costs.e relaxed conception thus seems prefer-
10 In much the same way, one could argue that the “traditional” reading of the Peircean ac-
count of truth could entails that no belief is true, since if the “end of inquiry” fails to pick
out even a possible state, there would be no beliefs that would be held at the end of inquiry.
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able to the ideal conception even if it is merely an open question whether or
not rationality can be codied.
I must confess that I worry that I may be missing something here, since
I think that this alternate defense of relaxed canonicality is at least implicit
in Mölder’s book already, and I will look forward to hearing from Mölder
just why anything more should be needed to rule out the ideal conception
of canonicality.
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